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Introduction
In recent years, many European countries have introduced financial aid programs for training participation of employees (OECD 2004) .
1 These programs subsidize individual monetary costs for training fees. The political objective of providing financial aid is to increase self-financed training activities of the employees. Increasing participation in lifelong learning is a political aim that was formulated by the strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training 'ET 2020'. While many studies have been concerned with training for the unemployed as part of active labor market policies (see e.g. Card et al. 2010 for an overview), much less is known about the effectiveness of financial aid to increase training participation of the employed population.
This study analyzes whether a newly introduced voucher program in Germany that reduces individual training costs by half has the potential to increase employees' training participation. In a randomized field experiment, a treatment group of eligible employees were given detailed information by telephone about the voucher, its conditions and how to obtain it. Both the treatment and the control group were drawn from a representative sample of eligible employees and they were not aware of participating in an experiment at any time. At the time of the first interview, only one-fourth of the eligible employees knew of the existence of the voucher program which could be the reason why in the overall population the number of issued vouchers was low shortly after voucher introduction. Comparing the treatment groups' voucher take-up in a follow-up survey one year later with the corresponding outcomes of the control group reveals whether it is the information constraint or whether it is the voucher itself that is responsible for low take-up rates. If the reasons for low voucher take-up are due to the design and the conditions of the voucher, the voucher will not be effective in raising training levels. Our paper is related to different strands of the literature. We contribute to the literature being concerned with the effects of financial aid for educational attainment that was most often investigated with respect to schooling and tertiary education (see e.g. Deming and Dynarski 2010 for a review). With respect to financial aid for training, Schwerdt et al. (2012) and Hidalgo et al. (2014) show that training levels can be slightly increased by training vouchers that reimburse a fixed amount of the training costs which allows individuals to participate in training without bearing any of the training costs. In contrast to such vouchers, many of the voucher programs introduced at the European level rather finance a fixed share of the costs and require self-financing of the remaining training costs. Thus, our findings have important implications from a public policy point of view.
Because our field experiment comprises an information treatment about the voucher, we also contribute to the literature analyzing the role of information about financial aid on aid takeup and educational choice. 2 In particular, Dinkelman and Martínez (2014) show that informing 8 th grade students about how to finance higher education increases the probability that they will enroll in a college preparatory high school and reduces absence from school. Bettinger et al. (2012) provide evidence that financial aid information alone does not increase college attendance unless applicants are given assistance with filling out a lengthy application form. Additionally, Booij et al. (2011) reveal that informing students about loans does not affect their behavior with respect to loan take-up. Our analysis examines adult education investment decisions that are undertaken after having entered the labor market. To our knowledge, we are the first to relieve the information constraints on training subsidies for the group of employees. Training decisions differ from decisions regarding college enrollment because they are less costly, much shorter in duration, occur more frequently and involve much lower opportunity costs because training usually occurs while employed, thus requiring no break in employment.
The main results indicate no significant effect of the information intervention on training activities measured at the extensive and intensive margin, i.e. by training incidence and the number of courses attended. This is because the intervention did not affect voucher take-up of the treatment group. We can rule out that this insignificant effect is due to an ineffective information treatment because the intervention did increase program knowledge one year after the treatment by a significant 8 to 9 percentage points, representing a 30-percent knowledge increase compared with the control group. The insignificant effect on voucher take-up can also not be attributed to small samples sizes (3,110 individuals participated in both panel waves) and limited statistical inference because power calculations reveal that an effect size for voucher take-up of as little as 0.6 percentage points would have turned statistically significant. We conclude that other reasons than the lack of information were responsible for not taking up the voucher and, thus, for not increasing training of the eligible employees.
Based on descriptive analyses, we additionally discuss reasons for why the voucher was ineffective in raising training quotas. This is another novel aspect of our paper that is particularly relevant for policy. We suggest that the non-existent intervention effect on voucher take-up is because reducing training costs by half does not increase the demand for self-financed training. This might be the case because most employees are able to satisfy their training needs with financial support of their employers.
3 Furthermore, non-participants in training report as most important reasons for non-participation to have no training demand, no time for training participation or low expected training returns. And the small share of employees who could not participate in training because of liquidity constraints are often not able to bear the remaining half of the training costs after redeeming the voucher. We suggest that our conclusions apply to other voucher programs which have a similar design as the German voucher. Policy makers planning to introduce training vouchers should put effort into analyzing the specific reasons for non-participation in training before designing and introducing a voucher.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the voucher program and section 3 describes the data, the experimental design and the empirical strategy. Section 4 documents the main results, section 5 discusses them in detail and section 6 concludes. 6
Background: The voucher program
The training voucher program Bildungsprämie (henceforth, the "BP voucher") was implemented in Germany in December 2008. In 2010 and 2011, the years of interest in this paper, the voucher reduced direct training costs by up to 50% for a maximum subsidy of 500 Euro and was targeted at employees. 4 Direct costs cover fees for participation in training courses that are charged by the providers of training. The voucher could be used for training at the vast majority of German training providers. The goals of the program were to increase the participation of employees in training activities, to enable them to individually finance lifelong learning activities and not only to participate in training financed by their employer. Training that was partly or fully financed by the employer was excluded from the subsidy. Note that employers are generally the major source of financing for training, not only in Germany but in Europe in general (Bassanini et al. 2007 ).
Eligibility for the BP voucher was pegged to several criteria. First, the voucher was only available for employees and self-employed workers with low or medium income. The income thresholds for taxable household income were 25,600 Euro per year for singles and 51,200 Euro for married couples. Approximately two-thirds of all employees (around 25 million) meet these income criteria. The unemployed were not eligible for the program but instead had access to active labor market programs. Second, only work-related training could be co-financed with the voucher and the voucher could not be used for training that had started before the voucher was issued or for training that was offered by the employer of the applicant. Third, the direct training costs that remained after deducting the voucher had to be borne by the applicants themselves; i.e., the voucher could not be combined with employer support or other public subsidies. Vouchers were issued in person at one of the 500 counselling offices located all over Germany. Counselling served the purpose of verifying the eligibility criteria and recording the training content on the voucher. The number of vouchers issued per person was restricted to one per year. When booking a course at a training provider, the voucher reduced individuals' fees immediately. Training providers were reimbursed by a governmental agency after submitting the voucher to the agency.
Next, we present results from administrative data regarding all vouchers and voucher users (RWI et al. 2012) . The number of vouchers issued per year increased from approximately 63,000 in 2010 to 95,000 in 2011. With respect to the number of eligible employees, the share of program users equals 0.4 percent in 2011 (95,000/25,000,000=0.4 percent). The average redemption rate of vouchers was 78%. RWI et al. (2012) further show that the program users were a highly selective group and not representative for the sample of eligible employees. For example, 74% of program users were women compared with the corresponding share of 53 percent among the group of eligible employees. Approximately 17% were working as physical therapists, although their share within the group of eligible employees is less than 1 percent. The likely reason for this discrepancy is that women working in the health sector (including physical therapists) participate more frequently in self-financed training (with no financial involvement on the part of their employer), i.e., they participate more often in training that 7 could potentially be financed by the voucher. In conclusion, the voucher was particularly attractive for a certain group of employees who sponsor training on their own with no employer involvement.
Experimental design, data and empirical strategy

Experimental design and data
The information intervention was implemented for a representative sample of eligible employees. The target population was drawn from administrative records of the social security system containing the income biography of employees, excluding self-employees and civil servants. Thus, the effect of the intervention is only representative of the sample of salaried employees, who, however, account for the vast majority of individuals eligible for the BP voucher (almost 90 percent of eligible employees are salaried and not self-employed or civil servants).
5 Eligible employees were initially interviewed by telephone in 2010, and the followup survey was administered approximately one year later in 2011. To avoid interviewees becoming aware of taking part in an experiment and to rule out unit nonresponse being systematically related to respondents' previous training participation or financial aid utilization, the telephone survey was labeled "Employment today and tomorrow". The information intervention was conducted at the end of the first interview, after general information on sociodemographics, employment aspects and previous training participation was collected. The second wave updated this general information, including information on the outcome variables of interest for the main analyses. At no time were respondents informed that they were part of an experiment.
The information intervention was randomly assigned to a 50-percent sample of the eligible survey respondents. 6 The intervention informed interviewees about the BP voucher, how to apply for and use it. The information was provided interactively; interviewees were asked to rate the attractiveness of the program and its conditions. They were also asked to indicate which sources they would use to inform themselves about the program and one of the answer categories contained the exact URL of the program webpage. In total, six questions were posed, as shown in Appendix A-2. The interactive method of informing about the program was chosen to support respondents' concentration and motivation as opposed to an intervention that provided information with no further involvement by the respondents. Overall, the intervention took approximately 5 minutes of the interview. The control group did not receive any such information as part of the interview.
8
Six months after the first interview, all participants in the telephone interview received a letter for panel maintenance expressing gratitude for participation in the first interview and reminding them of the second interview to come. The letter also served the purpose of reminding the treatment group about the BP voucher, in particular, by an enclosed flyer whose content differed by treatment status. While the flyer informed the control group about firstwave results on changes in respondents' work life (how often respondents were confronted with new tasks in the workplace and how well they managed to cope with them), the treatment groups' flyer informed them about employees' training participation and the voucher program, including the URL of the program webpage. This information is important because 88 percent of the treated individuals stated in the first interview that they would use the internet as a source to obtain information about the program. The flyers for the treatment and the control group can be found in Appendices A-3 and A-4, respectively.
In both panel waves, all respondents were asked about their general knowledge about financial aid programs in the area of education and training. For each of four programs that are available for funding vocational education, college or employee training in Germany, the interviewees were asked whether they knew that the program existed. The specific question reads as follows: "I will now read out a list of public programs that provide financial support to enable participation in training and in education more generally. Please tell me whether you have heard about the respective program before or used it." The BP voucher was one of the four programs being presented to the respondents in randomized order. Individuals who knew of the BP voucher were also asked about previous program utilization. Of course, in the first interview, the treatment group was asked about program knowledge before the information intervention was conducted.
In the first wave, 5,019 interviews were conducted with eligible employees, of whom 2,501 received the information treatment and 2,518 did not. In the second wave, the sample consisted of 1,516 treated individuals and 1,594 individuals from the control group. The attrition rate between the first and the second interview was similar for the treatment (39%) and the control group (37%). Table 1 displays t-tests on the similarity of the characteristics between the treatment and control groups, documenting that the average characteristics for survey respondents in the first wave and for respondents in both waves are always balanced. None of the considered characteristics differs significantly by treatment status, indicating that the treatment and the control group are balanced.
7 Note that the balancing tests hold not only for the vast majority of socio-demographic and educational variables but also for the level of knowledge about the voucher program before the information treatment occurred. In the first wave, only one-fifth of the respondents in the treatment and the control group knew that the BP voucher program existed (22-23 percent), which means that more than three-quarters of eligible employees had never heard about the program two years after its introduction.
To provide further evidence on the quality of the randomization of the experiment, multivariate regressions were run to test the balancing of the treatment and the control group 9 and to test whether panel attrition is unrelated to the treatment status. Differential attrition was tested by regressing panel dropout on treatment status and individual control variables, revealing no statistically significant influence of the treatment on attrition (see column 1 of Table B-2). 8 Furthermore, we regressed the treatment indicator on individual characteristics to determine whether the characteristics are jointly significant. Columns 2 and 3 of Table B -2 show that the F-test of joint significance of the individual characteristics is insignificant for the first wave sample (p-value: 0.7203) and for the sample of individuals responding in both panel waves (p-value: 0.6546). Table 1 is of further interest to describe the average characteristics of eligible employees. Women's share is 53 percent among eligible individuals. This figure is plausible because eligibility is tied to the level of income, which tends on average to be lower for women. Approximately 40 percent of eligible employees participated in training during the 12 months before the first interview and around one-quarter reported having training intentions for the coming 12 months; in particular, they indicated on a four-item scale that they intended to participate in training "for sure". Additional analyses combining first and second wave information reveal that the training intentions measured in the first wave are good predictors of actual participation because more than 75 percent of the individuals realized their plans in the second wave. Table 1 also shows that slightly more than one-fourth of eligible employees reported being liquidity constrained in the first interview. The dummy variable for liquidity constraints are based on a question asking respondents, how easily they could replace a good of daily use if it gets broken.
9 Individuals responding that they would not be able to replace this good were considered constrained. Although this question is of a subjective nature, it is more appropriate than household income because it also encompasses differences in household size and fixed-payment obligations (either for consumption or loans). A similar question for liquidity constraints was also used by Dohmen et al. (2010) . 
Empirical framework
Because of the random assignment of the treatment, a comparison of individuals' outcomes between the treatment and control group identifies the causal effects of the information intervention. The intention-to-treat (ITT) effects that we estimate answer the question how the outcomes of interest would evolve, if our information treatment were provided to all eligible employees. The outcomes are estimated by the following regression:
( 1) where Yi are the second-wave outcomes of individual i, in particular program knowledge, program take-up and training activities measured as binary variable (training incidence) and as the number of courses attended (training intensity). The training questions refer to work-related classroom training such as courses, seminars or lectures in the time between the first and second interview. The variable Treat indicates individuals' assignment to the treatment (1) or to the control group (0). The vector X includes control variables such as socio-demographics and educational attainment and is the idiosyncratic error term.
For outcomes for which there is pre-treatment information available, fixed effects regressions can additionally be estimated by the following model: (2) where Yit represents the outcomes program knowledge and the binary training indicator of individual i at time t (with t=1, 2). As Treat equals one for the treatment group in t=2 and zero otherwise, it identifies the difference-in-differences effect. The vector X remains as described above, although only time-varying control variables can be incorporated. The variable represents the individual-specific intercept controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity, which was found to matter for training decisions (Pischke 2001 , Görlitz 2011 ). Motivated, talented or ambitious individuals participate more intensively in training. The idiosyncratic error term is indicated by . The standard errors account for clustering at the individual level. If equations (1) and (2) return similar effects in terms of size and significance, this would be an indication that the treatment and the control group are also balanced with respect to time-invariant unobservables or that time-invariant unobservables do not alter the results. Table 2 documents the effects of the information treatment on outcomes that are measured one year after providing the intervention. The first column summarizes the effects on individuals' program knowledge, in which the upper and lower panels present estimates of equations (1) and (2), respectively. The average knowledge about the program in the control group is 28 percent in the second interview; that is, three years after the introduction of the program, more than 70 percent of the eligible employees are still unaware of its existence. The treatment group experienced an average knowledge increase caused by the information intervention by a statistically significant 8.4 to 9.0 percentage points. The period between the first and second interview is one year, which is a long time compared with other studies that measure a change of knowledge between 3 and 7 months after administering the treatment (Dinkelmann and Martinez 2011, Booij et al. 2011 , Jensen 2010 . Thus, the knowledge increase in our experiment should be interpreted as a long-term effect. The short-term knowledge increase might be higher because people tend to forget information, particularly if it appears to be of little relevance to them.
Results
Intention-to-treat estimates
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Column (2) displays the results of the information treatment on actual program take-up. The intervention did not increase program take-up of the treatment group on any reasonable statistically significant level. Importantly, the reason for the statistically insignificant result cannot be attributed to sample size issues. Power calculations reveal that even a small increase in program take-up of 0.6 percentage points would have been sufficient to provide statistically significant results at the 5-percent level given the sample size and the control group mean. Relating the 0.6 to the average knowledge increase of the treatment group shows that the coefficient on program take-up would have become statistically significant if only one out of 15 individuals (=0.6 ppt /9.0 ppt) who learned about the program by the intervention had obtained a training voucher. Furthermore, note that the share of voucher recipients in the control group is approximately the same (0.5 percent) as the share of voucher recipients in the entire population of eligible individuals (0.4 percent; see the second section).
Although there is no effect on program take-up, an effect of the intervention on individuals' training activities could emerge, if the information affected training through channels other than reducing training costs by utilizing the voucher. For instance, learning that the government sponsors training might increase employees' training motivation and intention by showing how necessary public agents consider training. Alternatively, the intervention could have prompted more information about the program being gathered on the internet, ultimately resulting in use of another public program subsidizing training. Although there are few financial aid programs in Germany, the BP voucher clearly being the most far-reaching, there are alternative voucher programs that finance training in a few federal states.
11 The effect of the information treatment on training activities is documented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 . There are no statistically significant effects of the intervention on the training activities of the treatment group. Additionally, the size of the point estimates is small compared with the secondwave control group mean in the case of both the cross-sectional model and the fixed effects model (see first row of Table 2 ). As a robustness check, the Appendix Table B-3 shows the equivalent results when re-estimating all regressions excluding the covariates, which leaves the main results unaffected. Table 2 : Effects of the information treatment on program knowledge, take-up and training Notes: The cross-sectional models regress the second-wave outcomes on a treatment indicator and control variables measured in the first interview (i.e., gender, age, migrant, partner, children, East Germany, education dummies, previous training participation, training intentions and liquidity constraints). The fixed effects models include as covariates children and education dummies. When omitting the control variables, the effects are virtually the same (see Table B -3 in the Appendix). Standard errors are robust (in the cross-sectional models) or account for clustering at the individual level (in the fixed effects models). Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Heterogeneity of treatment effects
Because the reasons for non-participation in training might be manifold and because the voucher only affects financial reasons or cost-benefit considerations, one would not necessarily expect homogeneous treatment effects from the information intervention in the group of treated individuals. Instead, the highest possible effects should be observed for individuals with training intentions or with liquidity constraints. Table 3 summarizes the results of subgroup analyses, particularly cross-sectional regressions accounting for heterogeneity in several dimensions. Individuals with definite training intentions in the first interview are considerably more likely to have remembered the information about the voucher program until the second interview. The information treatment increased the knowledge of these individuals by 13 percentage points (p-value: 0.001), nearly two times that of individuals with no intentions (7 percentage points). This result is evidence that the knowledge increase was more pronounced for individuals most inclined to participate in training, i.e., those for whom the information was more relevant. Nevertheless, the group with training intentions did not take up the voucher more often; nor did their training activities increase significantly. Table 3 : Heterogeneous effects of the intervention Notes: The heterogeneous effects are estimated based on the cross-sectional model including an additional interaction term between the treatment indicator and the first-wave training intentions. Also, interactions between the treatment dummy and a measure of liquidity constraints is considered. Last, the treatment variable is interacted with an indicator for previous non-participants in training who mention financial costs as their main reason for non-participation. When omitting the control variables, the effects are virtually the same (see Appendix Table B-3). All regressions are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Outcomes measured one year following the experiment
Training intentions
Effect of information intervention (a) 0.069 ** 
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The second dimension of heterogeneity, i.e., the liquidity constraints, is derived from the theoretical consideration that the cost component of the training investments is a larger obstacle for liquidity constrained individuals. The results reveal that the joint effect of the information together with its interaction term with liquidity constraints differs significantly from zero in the regression using program knowledge as the dependent variable (p-value: 0.015) but the magnitude of the knowledge differences between constrained and non-constrained individuals is modest. Furthermore, program take-up and training activities also remain unaffected by the intervention for the group of constrained individuals. A third dimension of heterogeneity is analyzed by using a question posed in the first wave to non-participants of training requesting whether the main reason for non-participation was the financial cost.
12 This question combines the general willingness to participate in training with liquidity constraints and best approximates the target group of the voucher program. Their knowledge increased by as much as 20 percentage points, suggesting once more that remembering the information is not random but rather systematically related to the relevance of the information to the individual. 13 However, once again, there are no statistically significant treatment effects on program take-up or training.
IV estimates
The previously estimated ITT effects answer the question of what would happen to training levels, if the information treatment -as it was implemented in the experiment -were provided to all eligible employees. We would further like to understand the effect of knowing that the program exists on training investments. Local average treatment effects (LATE) are estimated based on an IV model where in the second stage the training outcomes are regressed on program knowledge and controls. The intervention is used for instrumenting program knowledge, which is a strong instrument (in the first stage regression the F-statistic of the instrument is 20).
14 As mentioned, there could be an effect of the intervention on training participation apart from program take-up, for example, by an increase in individuals' general motivation for training or the use of other voucher programs for financing. Table 4 shows the IV regression results estimating the effect of program knowledge on the extensive and intensive margin of training participation. They document that knowing that the program exists does not affect training incidence or intensity at any statistically significant level. Table 2 comes from restricting the sample to observations with complete information on program knowledge, treatment status, control variables, training incidence and training intensity. All regressions are estimated by linear models with robust standard errors. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Robustness of the results
One shortcoming of the previous analysis is that the reference period for measuring effects on training is the period between the first and the second interview, which covers only approximately one year, and this might be a rather short time period for detecting treatment effects. For instance, individuals participate in training because they perceive their skills have depreciated. Something like this does not necessarily occur frequently and, thus, training demands could also arise after a period of more than 12 months. To shed light on this issue, we use the second-wave information on training intentions for the next 12 months as an additional outcome variable while acknowledging that this outcome must be interpreted with care due to the subjective nature of the question. The first two columns of Table 5 summarize the ITT effects of the intervention on future training plans. Both the cross-sectional and the fixed effects regression return results that do not differ significantly from zero. The last two columns show the results of knowing about the program on future training plans, where the knowledge was instrumented with the information experiment. As before, there is no significant effect of program knowledge on future training plans, which is indicative evidence that the intervention and the increase in program knowledge as a result of it also have no effect on training activities in the medium term. ITT effects indicate the effects of regressing future training plans on treatment status in addition to controls. In the cross-sectional model in column (1), the control variables include first-wave information on gender, age, migrant, partner, children, East Germany, education dummies, previous training participation, training intentions and liquidity constraints. The fixed effects model in column (2) includes as covariates children and education dummies.
Columns (3) and (4) Another concern with the results could be that the time between the interviews did not always amount to exactly twelve months. Although the aim was to schedule the second interview 12 months after the first, this timing could not always be achieved because not all respondents were reachable by phone during the targeted time. The share of interviews that could be scheduled exactly 12 months later is 46 percent, which is almost the same as the share of interviews conducted 11 or 13 months after the first interview (48 percent). Only 5 percent of the second-wave interviews were administered 9, 10 or 14 months after the first one. Reestimating the main results by additionally controlling for the time between the interviews (not shown in the tables) leaves OLS and IV results virtually unchanged (e.g., for program knowledge and take-up, training activities and future training plans). This result is in line with further descriptive analysis revealing that the treatment and the control groups are balanced with respect to the time between the interviews (t-stat: 0.71).
Finally, the previous analyses applied linear regression models, although the dependent variables are inherently binary or count data. However, the main results are robust to estimating the effects based on non-linear regression models (not shown in the tables). In particular, we re-estimated the ITT effects using probit models for program knowledge, program take-up, training incidence and future training intentions as well as using a negative binomial model for the number of training courses. The sign, magnitude and significance are similar to the main results. Additionally, a fixed effects logit model confirms the difference-in-differences results, which were estimated by linear fixed effects in the main specification. 
Discussion
Our main results raise several questions, most importantly why the information about the program did not increase voucher take-up and, as a consequence, training. This section offers answers that are based on further descriptive analyses of the survey questions. As part of the information intervention, treated individuals were asked to assess the conditions of the voucher (see Appendix A-2 for the survey questions). Overall, the responses show that the treatment group is positive toward the idea of government financial support for training. Almost 96 percent view government training incentives in the form of BP vouchers as very good or good. Treated individuals were additionally asked whether they would be willing to participate in a 30-minute counselling session to obtain the voucher and how long they would be willing to travel to the counselling office. Two-thirds state that they would participate in counselling even when traveling takes 30 minutes or more. Individuals were also asked whether they could imagine participating in training using the BP voucher during the next 12 months and 34 percent stated that they could imagine doing so. In summary, we conclude that visiting a counselling office is not an obstacle for voucher take-up for most of the eligible employees and one-third of the respondents could imagine to use the voucher in the future. Why, then, have there been no effects of the information treatment on voucher take-up?
The purpose of the BP voucher is to relax the liquidity constraints of individuals who could not afford to finance training. To gauge whether financial restrictions have the potential to discourage employees from participation, individuals were asked in the first interview about their reasons for non-participation in the past. Specifically, non-participants in the first interview were presented a list of potential reasons of which they were asked to identify the most relevant reasons that applied to them. In the treatment and the control group alike, 15 percent of all non-participants identified the financial burden as the main reason for nonparticipation. This corresponds to only 5 percent of all employees eligible for the BP voucher, which we assess as being a rather small sub-group. More importantly, because voucher utilization requires self-financing of the other half of the training costs, this sub-group with low financial liquidity might not be able to afford paying the other half of the training costs that remains after deducting the voucher. Indeed, as many as 58 percent indicated at the time of the first interview that they would not be able to replace a good used daily if broken, which differs greatly from the mean of 24 percent of the entire treatment group. In summary, there is only a small group of eligible employees for whom liquidity constraints are the main reason for nonparticipation in training and who could afford paying the other half of the costs.
Note that 85 percent of the non-participants reported other main reasons for previous non-participation in training activities. In particular, 23 percent of the non-participants stated that they had no need for training, 19 percent mentioned health-and family-related reasons, 19 percent had no time for training, 10 percent expected low returns, 7 percent did not know which training would be useful and 7 percent reported that the training supply was insufficient. As the BP voucher is designed especially to remove financial barriers for non-participation, it is not effective to increase training participation for individuals who have other reasons for nonparticipation.
Another issue that we want to discuss is why we do not observe deadweight losses for those individuals with training participation in the time period between the interviews. Since almost half of the treatment group have participated in training between the first and the second wave, we would have expected to observe voucher take-up among this group of individuals to co-finance training that they would have attended even in the absence of the voucher. To determine why there is no deadweight loss, the following descriptive analysis identifies all courses that could have potentially been financed by the voucher. As mentioned previously, most training courses in Germany are at least partly employer financed, excluding them from voucher eligibility as the BP voucher exclusively subsidizes self-financed training; courses financed or provided by the employer are not covered. In the second interview, individuals report whether their training activities between the interviews involved costs for training fees and whether employers defrayed at least some of these costs. Since most training of employees is fully or partly financed by employers, the share of individuals with training participation in at least one course that involves self-financing without any co-financing by employers is only 5 percent of all treated individuals. Furthermore, vouchers cannot be applied to training that is publicly financed by another financial aid program. Individuals were also asked whether they participated in training while employed or while unemployed of whom only the former could be subsidized by the BP voucher. Restricting the sample of eligible employees to training participants who additionally fulfill these criteria leads to an overall share of individuals who could have potentially used the voucher of less than 4 percent.
When this group is further reduced to those willing to participate in the counselling despite a travel time of 30 minutes or more, the share falls to 2 percent. In absolute numbers, this share corresponds to only 28 individuals in the treatment group. 45 percent of these individuals have borne costs of less than 100 Euro and approximately 25 percent costs between 100 and 200 Euro.
15 Further deleting those individuals whose self-financed training costs were below 200 Euro leaves only 9 individuals for whom the voucher could have been an attractive option. In conclusion, we observe only a small number of eligible employees whose training activities between the first and the second interview could potentially have been subsidized by the voucher, mainly because most courses were fully or partly financed by employers. This is the main reason for not finding evidence of any deadweight losses as a consequence of the intervention. Note also that our results imply that within this group of training participants, the voucher did not lead to an increased demand for training supplementing the employersponsored courses. We suggest as one reason that the overall training needs of employees are already satisfied by employer-financed courses.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effects of providing information about a training voucher program on voucher take-up and training participation. The voucher decreases a substantial amount of the training costs for employees. The analysis is conducted based on a field experiment with random assignment of the treatment group. The results suggest that the information intervention increased the treatment groups' program knowledge significantly compared with the control group. However, relieving the information constraint had no effect on voucher take-up or training activities. These results indicate that increasing eligible employees' general program knowledge, e.g., by allocating more resources to public relations work, would neither increase program take-up nor raise training levels. Because increased training levels by means of the voucher require voucher take-up at first, the results also indicate that the voucher is ineffective to increase the training participation quota of the employed population at large.
Descriptive results indicate that the reason for the inability of the voucher to stimulate training is that the financial burden is seldom the main reason for not participating in training. Many employees participate in employer-financed training with no personal financial involvement. The majority of non-participants in training report other reasons for previous nonparticipation such as no time, no training demands or low expected training returns. Only 5 percent of the eligible employees report the financial burden as being responsible for previous non-participation. However, for many of this small sub-group, bearing half of the training costs seems to be an obstacle for voucher take-up, as this particular group is characterized by particularly scarce financial resources. Comparing our results with those from Schwerdt et al. (2012) and Hidaldo et al. (2014) who analyze vouchers that do not necessarily require a financial contributions of the individuals and who find positive effects on voucher take-up and training suggest that paying half of the training costs might be an obstacle for increasing training levels for employees with limited financial resources. The cross-sectional models regress the second-wave outcomes on a treatment indicator. The heterogeneous effects are estimated based on the cross-sectional model, including an additional interaction term between the treatment indicator and, first, the training intentions in the first wave, second, a measure of liquidity constraints and, third, an indicator for previous non-participants in training who mention financial costs as the main reason for non-participation. The fixed effects model includes no covariates apart from the treatment indicator. Standard errors are robust (in the cross-sectional models) or account for clustering at the individual level (in the fixed effects models). Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Appendix B. Additional tables
Outcomes measured one year following the experiment 
